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WILLS, TRUSTS, AND ESTATES
J. Rodney Johnson*
I. INTRODUCTION
The 1991 session of the General Assembly enacted legislation
dealing with wills, trusts, and estates that added, amended, or re-
pealed a number of sections of the Code of Virginia ("Code"). In
addition to this legislation, there were six cases from the Supreme
Court of Virginia and one from the Virginia Court of Appeals, in
the year ending June 1, 1991, which involve issues of interest to
both the general practitioner and the specialist in wills, trusts, and
estates. This article analyzes each of these legislative and judicial
developments.1
II. 1991 LEGISLATION
A. Illegitimacy - Evidence of Paternity
As a consequence of Trimble v. Gordon,2 Virginia law was
amended in 1978 to permit an illegitimate child to inherit from the
father, a right already existing on the maternal side.3 However, a
concern about encouraging possible unfounded claims of paternity
led the legislature to restrict the evidence that might be used in
such cases4 to the same six categories of proof then allowable to
determine paternity5 in support proceedings brought against an al-
leged father on behalf of an illegitimate child.6 This restrictive
* Professor of Law, The T. C. Williams School of Law, University of Richmond; B.A.,
1965, College of William and Mary; J.D., 1967, Marshall-Wythe School of Law, College of
William and Mary; LL.M., 1970, New York University.
1. In order to facilitate the discussion of numerous Code of Virginia sections, they will be
generally referred to in the text by their section numbers only. Unless otherwise stated,
those section numbers will refer to the latest printing of the old sections and to the 1991
supplement for the new sections.
2. 430 U.S. 762 (1977) (inheritance rights of illegitimate children).
3. VA. CODE ANN. § 64.1-5.1 (Cum. Supp. 1991). The background of this development is
discussed in Johnson, Inheritance Rights of Children in Virginia, 12 U. RICH. L. REV. 275
(1978).
4. VA. CODE ANN. § 64.1-5.2 (Repl. Vol. 1987).
5. Id. § 20-61.1 (repealed & amended 1988); see id § 20-49.1 to -49.8 (Repl. Vol. 1990).
6. Trimble recognized that "(t)he more serious problems of proving paternity might jus-
tify a more demanding standard for illegitimate children claiming under their fathers' es-
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support statute was declared unconstitutional in 1985 because
"[s]uch restrictions on the available methods of proof imposed an
impenetrable barrier resulting in the kind of invidious discrimina-
tion contemplated by Gomez. ' '7
This ruling of unconstitutionality of the source for section 64.1-
5.2 of the Code naturally raised the question of the latter section's
constitutionality. 8 The legislature appears to have concluded that
the section was'unconstitutional, as evidenced by the nature of its
1991 amendments to section 64.1-5.2. In addition to expanding the
categories of admissible evidence from six to eight," the introduc-
tion to this list was changed from "shall be limited to the follow-
ing" to "may include but shall not be limited to the following"
and, most importantly, this enactment was passed as emergency
legislation," with a proviso that "the provisions of this act are de-
claratory of existing law."" It seems rather obvious that the only
way the "shall not be limited to" language of the amendment could
be declaratory of existing law would be if the prior statutory lan-
guage of "shall be limited to" was unconstitutional.
The 1991 legislation effectively eliminates the evidentiary limita-
tion faced by illegitimates in succession litigation since 1978.12
However, illegitimate persons, or those claiming through them, still
tates than that required either for illegitimate children claiming under their mothers' es-
tates or for legitimate children generally." 430 U.S. at 770.
7. Jones v. Robinson, 229 Va. 276, 287, 329 S.E.2d 794, 801 (1985) (consolidating sub.
nom. Jones v. Robinson, Whiteman v. Kelley, and Vivier v. Page) (referring to Gomez v.
Perez, 409 U.S. 535 (1983)). The court's decision applied only to § 20-61.1 as it existed prior
to its expansion in 1982, which was the same language it contained in 1978 when it served as
the basis for § 64.1-5.2.
8. See Johnson, Wills, Trusts, and Estates: Annual Survey of Virginia Law, 19 U. RicH.
L. REv. 779, 792-94 (1985).
9. The added categories are as follows:
7. The results of medically reliable genetic blood grouping tests weighted with all the
evidence; or
8. Medical or anthropological evidence relating to the alleged parentage of the child
based on tests performed by experts.
VA. CODE ANN. § 64.1-5.2 (Cum Supp. 1991).
10. Act of March 22, 1991, ch. 479, 1991 Va. Acts, cl. 3 (to be codified at VA. CODE ANN. §
64.1-5.2) (emphasis added). Emergency legislation becomes effective immediately upon be-
ing signed by the governor. Thus, instead of becoming effective on July 1, this legislation
was effective when signed by the governor on March 22, 1991.
11. Id. cl. 2.
12. Although § 64.1-5.2 of the Code is located in that portion of the Code relating to
intestate succession, its language expressly provides that it is applicable "[flor purposes of
this title," thereby making it applicable to cases involving testate succession as well.
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face a time restriction not applicable to legitimate persons' 3 which
may be unconstitutionally discriminatory. 14
B. Legitimation of Children - Reproductive Technology
Section 64.1-7.1 of the Code, previously dealing with the legiti-
mation of children conceived by means of the artificial insemina-
tion of a married woman, is extended to also cover children con-
ceived by in vitro fertilization or other reproductive technology
which uses the sperm of a donor, other than her husband, or an
ovum from another woman, or both. In all of these cases, if the
woman and her husband consent in writing to the reproductive
technology and to accept parentage of any resulting child, such
child "shall be, for all purposes, the legitimate natural child of
such woman and her husband.' 1 5 This legislation, intended in part
to confine the impact of erroneous statements of law in Welborn v.
Commonwealth"6 to the parties of that case, also provides that
neither sperm nor ova donors have either parental rights or duties
in regard to such a child, and that its provisions are declaratory of
existing law.' 7
C. Power to Invade Principal - Constructional Rule
Section 64.1-67.2 was added to the Code in 1988 in order to
eliminate any estate, 8 gift, 9 or income tax 2° exposure in trusts
13. Section 64.1-5.1.3 of the Code provides that "[n]o claim of succession based on the
relationship between a child born out of wedlock and a parent of such child shall be recog-
nized in the settlement of any decedents estate unless" an affidavit alleging parenthood and
an action seeking a circuit court proceeding to determine parenthood are filed "within one
year of the date of the death of such parent."
14. This issue was raised in Johnson, Wills, Trusts, and Estates: Annual Survey of Vir-
ginia Law, 20 U. RiCH. L. REv. 955, 964-66 (1986). Since that time, the decision in Tulsa
Professional Collection Serv. Inc. v. Pope, 485 U.S. 478 (1988), has raised another possible
ground of constitutional challenge. In broad scope, Pope held that when state action has an
adverse effect upon a person's property right, it violates the due process clause of the four-
teenth amendment unless it is accompanied by reasonable notice. An illegitimate's claim of
succession is clearly a property right. Note also the Code's provision that the one-year provi-
sion of § 64.1-5.1.3 of the Code, quoted in supra note 13, "shall run notwithstanding the
minority of such child."
15. VA. CODE ANN. § 64.1-7.1 (Curn. Supp. 1991).
16. 10 Va. App. 631, 394 S.E.2d 732 (Va. Ct. App. 1990); see infra note 100 and accompa-
nying text.
17. Act of Mar. 6, 1991, ch. 89, 1 1991 Va. Acts 119, cl. 2.
18. I.R.C. § 2041 provides, for estate tax purposes, that a decedents gross estate includes
the value of property over which the decedent had a general power of appointment at death.
19. I.R.C. § 2514 provides, for gift tax purposes, that a person who makes a lifetime exer-
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where the drafter mistakenly gave a fiduciary, who was also a ben-
eficiary, a power to invade principal for the fiduciary/beneficiary's
benefit.21 The thrust of the statute is to either reduce the power
from a general to a special, or to take the power away from the
fiduciary/beneficiary entirely. The 1991 amendments to section
64.1-67.2 of the Code are intended to clarify the original enact-
ment22 and, to that end, they are stated to be declaratory of ex-
isting law.2s Note that the remedy of this section is applicable only
to powers over the principal of a trust.2 4 However, the problem this
statute seeks to eliminate can also arise when the fiduciary/benefi-
ciary has a comparable power over trust income. Thus, further
amendment of the statute to provide a similar remedy for such in-
come powers is desirable.
D. Pretermitted Spouse
Section 64.1-69.1 was added to the Code in 198525 to provide an-
other remedy for a surviving spouse for whom no provision was
made in a deceased spouse's premarital will, if such nonprovision
was unintentional. 2  Accordingly, the section expressly provided
cise or release of a general power of appointment is treated as a transferor of the property
subject to the power.
20. I.R.C. § 678 provides, for income tax purposes, that one holding a general power of
appointment over property is treated as the owner of that property.
21. For background and discussion, see Johnson, Wills, Trusts, and Estates: Annual Re-
view of Virginia Law, 22 U. RICH. L. REv. 759, 764-66 (1988).
22. These clarifications are intended to rebut a possible IRS challenge. As one writer has
noted:
The IRS had challenged comparable rules of construction in other jurisdictions on
two opposing theories: that the statutes are ineffective because their sole purpose was
tax avoidance, see Sheedy v. U.S., 63 AFTR 2d 148,958 (E.D. Wis. 1988); or that
they are inapplicable whenever the governing instrument states any standard, regard-
less of how broad or limited. See Priv. Ltr. Rul. 8912014 (12/12/88). To avoid these
extreme positions, the amendment attempts to define (and thereby limit) the situa-
tions in which the statutory rule of construction will not apply. It makes the rule
applicable unless:
a. The testator or settlor expressly manifests a contrary intention by referring to
a fiduciary's invasion or use of trust funds 'for the fiduciary's own benefit' or 'with-
out regard to the fiduciary's personal benefit' or words of similar import or by re-
ferring to VA. CODE § 64.1-67.2 specifically; or
b. A court construes the document to the contrary.
Gray, Selected Virginia Legislative Developments, 8 Va. St. Bar Tr. & Est. Newsl. No. 3, at
3 (Summer 1991).
23. Act of Mar. 20, 1991, ch. 432, 1 1991 Va. Acts 1263, cl. 2.
24. VA. CODE ANN. § 64.1-67.2 (Cum. Supp. 1991).
25. For background, see supra note 8, at 787.
26. At the time of the enactment, in 1985, the omitted surviving spouse's remedies were
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that its remedy of an intestate share for the omitted surviving
spouse would not apply if it appeared from the will that the omis-
sion was intentional. The 1991 amendment further provides for the
nonavailability of this remedy if it appears "from the provisions of
a premarital or marital agreement executed or validated under the
Premarital Agreement Act (§ 20-147 et seq.)" that the omission of
the surviving spouse was intentional.2 7 The need for this amend-
ment might at first seem doubtful. This is because if the right to a
pretermitted spouse's share was yielded in such a contract, the
spouse's claim should be offset by an equivalent claim by the es-
tate for breach of the contract. However, the remedy of the statute
is automatic and mandatory -"the omitted spouse shall receive
... ,' Accordingly, as there is no need for the surviving spouse
to make any claim in order to take, there is no corresponding crea-
tion of an offsetting claim in favor of the decedent's estate. There-
fore, the amendment was necessary to eliminate the right to such a
share in instances where it had been waived.
The 1991 amendment does not solve the problem of this section;
it only remedies one of its symptoms. Although this section was
based upon a concept contained in Uniform Probate Code
("UPC") section 2-301(a),2 e the legislature failed to include certain
UPC language that (i) should have eliminated the need for the pre-
sent amendment, and (ii) would have closed other loopholes still
remaining. This omitted language would also deny the section's
remedy if "the testator provided for the spouse by transfer outside
the will and the intent that the transfer be in lieu of a testamen-
tary provision is shown by statements of the testator or from the
amount of the transfer or other evidence."30 It would appear that
further, comprehensive amendment of this statute is necessary to
deal with other problems before they arise or, in light of the new
protections provided for a surviving spouse in the 1990 augmented
estates' legislation, perhaps it is time to repeal this section.
i) to claim dower or curtesy in the decedent's realty under §§ 64.1-19 to -44, and (ii) to
claim a statutory forced share in the decedent's personalty under §§ 64.1-13 to -16. Since
January 1, 1991, these remedies have been replaced by one remedy. an elective share in
realty and personalty in the decedent's augmented estate. For background and discussion of
this development, see Gray, Virginia's Augmented Estate System: Annual Survey of Vir-
ginia Law, 24 U. RICH. L. REv. 513 (1990).
27. VA. CODE ANN. § 64.1-69.1 (Interim Supp. 1991).
28. Id. (emphasis added).
29. UNn'. PROB. CODE § 2-301(a), 8 U.L.A. 88 (1983).
30. This section of the UPC was itself amended in 1990 to further restrict the availability
of its remedy.
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E. Pour Over Trust - Residency of Trustee
Section 64.1-73 of the Code is amended to provide that certain
nonresidents may serve as the sole trustee of an inter vivos trust
without thereby disqualifying the trust from receiving testamen-
tary additions.31 The listing of authorized nonresidents conforms
with the listing found in a similar statute applicable to personal
representatives and testamentary trustees.2 Again paralleling this
latter statute, section 64.1-73 of the Code requires that, prior to
any distribution to the trustee of a pour over trust that has no
Virginia cotrustee, (i) the nonresident must appoint a resident
agent for receipt of process in trust related matters, and (ii) "bond
with surety shall be required in every case. '3 3
One question left unanswered by the new amendment is whether
the amount of the bond and surety must correspond to the value of
the entire inter vivos trust, or only to the testamentary addition
thereto. From both a logical and a policy analysis it would appear
that the latter possibility is the correct answer. A second unan-
swered question is what mechanism, if any, insures the continuing
sufficiency of this bond and surety? This question is not so easily
answered. In the case of a testamentary trustee, section 26-2 of the
Code requires the commissioner of accounts to examine the suffi-
ciency of the bond and surety of a testamentary trustee as part of
the commissioner's inspection of the testamentary trustee's annual
accounting. However, as the trustee of an inter vivos trust is not
required to make such an accounting, and as section 64.1-73(d)(1)
of the Code provides that a testamentary pour over to such a trust
"shall not be deemed held under a testamentary trust of the testa-
tor," there appears to be no procedure under existing law to insure
the continuing sufficiency of the bond and surety.
31. The listing includes:
a parent, brother, or sister of the testator, a child or other descendant of the testator,
the spouse of a child of the testator, the surviving spouse of the testator, or a person
or all such persons otherwise eligible to file a statement in lieu of an accounting pur-
suant of § 26-20.1, or any combination of them.
VA. CODE ANN. § 64.1-73(3)(iii) (Cum. Supp. 1991).
32. Id. § 26-59(B).
33. Id. § 64.1-73(A)(2)(iii).
930 [Vol. 25:925
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F. Trust Reformation, Consolidation and Termination
The new section 55-19.4 of the Code authorizes the judicial ref-
ormation of any trust, upon petition by a beneficiary or fiduciary
and a finding of good cause, 4 "in any manner,35 including, without
limitation, dividing a trust into two or more separate trusts, 6 con-
solidating two or more separate trusts into a single trust,3 7 or ter-
minating the trust 8 and ordering distribution of the trust property
regardless of any spendthrift or similar protective provision." In
addition to finding "good cause"3 " for any reformation, the court
must generally also find that any proposed reformation "will
neither materially impair the accomplishment of the trust pur-
poses nor .. .adversely affect the interests of any beneficiary."
These additional findings, however, are not required in termination
cases.40 This enactment was passed as emergency legislation 41 and
34. According to the Code:
For purposes of any reformation of a trust, good cause may be shown by evidence of
(i) changes in any federal or Virginia tax laws, or the construction of such laws,
whether by statute, court decision, regulation, ruling or otherwise which, in the ab-
sence of reformation, would materially impair the purposes of the trust or adversely
affect the interests of the trustor or any beneficiary, or which, if reformation were
made, would materially benefit the trust or the interests of the trustor or any benefi-
ciary or (ii) existing circumstances such that the purposes of the trust WIl be im-
paired or the interests of the trustor or any beneficiary adversely affected if the refor-
mation is not made or that reformation if made would benefit the trust or interests of
the trustor or any beneficiary.
VA. CODE ANN. § 55-19.4D(1) (Cum. Supp. 1991).
35. The potential scope of permissible reformation is further evidenced by the provision
that "[t]he court may order that the reformation be effective prospectively only or be retro-
active to the date of the trust's creation, the date of death of the trustor or testator or such
other date as the court may direct." Id. § 55-19.4(C).
36. This enactment repeals the provision for judicial division of a trust formerly found in
§ 55-19.3(B); the provision for nonjudicial division, formerly designated as subsection A of
that section, is now the only subject of § 55-193. See id. § 55-19.3.
37. The court must find that the dispositive provisions of trusts are substantially similar
before ordering their consolidation. Id. § 55-19.4(B)(1).
38. According to the Code:
For purposes of termination of a trust, good cause may be shown as set forth in sub-
division 1 of this subsection [the "good cause" required for reformation, set out in
note 39, infra] or by evidence that (i) the costs of administration are such that the
establishment or the continuance of the trust would impair the purposes of the trust,
or (ii) the value of the trust principal is $25,000 or less, with no expectation of addi-
tions to the principal other than from interest or other earnings.
Id. § 55-19.4(D)(2).
39. See supra note 38. As the elements of this definition are stated in the alternative, the
requirement of "good cause" reduces to no more than a finding "that reformation if made
would benefit . . . the trustor or any beneficiary." Id. § 55-19.4(D)(1).
40. In exempting termination from the immediately preceding requirements in the text,
the statute parts company with the Claflin Rule [so named because derived from Claflin v.
UNIVERSITY OF RICHMOND LAW REVIEW
as declaratory of existing law.42
In the hands of a judge who is a literalist, or who is untutored in
this area of the law, this new termination procedure can be used to
destroy much of what estate planning is all about. Look, for exam-
ple, at what can happen in the ordinary case of a parent who pro-
vides a trust for the lifetime of a child - or one spouse for another
- and the beneficiary seeks termination thereof. As "good cause"
can be established by showing that termination would benefit the
life tenant,4 3 and as "materially impair[ing] the accomplishment of
the trust purposes" is of no concern in termination cases," it is
clear that such a trust could be terminated. And it is equally clear
that this possibility is a reversal of existing Virginia law confirmed
by the Virginia Supreme Court as recently as 1990.45
What does this new provision do to the heretofore hallowed con-
cept of testator's, or settlor's, intent? How does an attorney pro-
tect a client's intent from such mischief, particularly as the statute
specifically authorizes "terminating the trust and ordering distri-
bution of the trust property regardless of any spendthrift or simi-
lar protective provision?"' 44 Absent remedial action to restrict the
scope of this statute, it may be that the prudent Virginia attorney
will be forced to create trusts under the laws of other jurisdictions
in order to insure that a client's legitimate purposes will not be
Claflin, 149 Mass. 19, 20 N.E. 454 (1889)] which precludes termination that would (i) defeat
a testator's (settlor's) material purpose, or (ii) adversely affect the interests of any non-
consenting beneficiary. See RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TRUSTS § 337 (1959). The Supreme
Court of Virginia recently applied the Claflin Rule in Landmark Communications v. Sovran
Bank, 239 Va. 158, 387 S.E.2d 484 (1990). This enactment also repeals the former provision
for termination of small trusts, which required that "[t]he court shall be satisfied that the
termination of the trust will not cause the purposes of the trust to fail so far as these can be
achieved with the limited funds." VA. CODE ANN. § 55-19.2, repealed by Act of Mar. 20,
1991, ch. 415, 1 1991 Va. Acts 621, cl. 3.
41. Act of March 20, 1991, ch. 415, 1 1991 Va. Acts 621, cl. 4. Because the legislation was
designated as emergency legislation, the enactment became law upon being signed by the
governor on March 20, 1991. Regular legislation is effective on July 1 of the year of
enactment.
42. Id. at 622, cl. 2 (which also provides "however, this declaration shall not be construed
so as to affect the rights of the parties to any action, litigation, or proceeding commenced by
filing prior to July 1, 1991.").
43. "[G]ood cause may be shown by evidence that reformation [termination] . . . would
benefit ... any beneficiary." VA. CODE ANN. § 55-19.4(D)(1) (Cum. Supp. 1991).
44. Id. § 55-19.4(B)(2)(i).
45. See Landmark Communications v. Sovran Bank, 239 Va. 158, 387 S.E.2d 484 (1990),
and cases therein cited.
46. VA. CODE ANN. § 55-19.4(A) (Cune. Supp. 1991).
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frustrated.47
G. Creation of Trust - Structured Settlements
Section 8.01-424 of the Code provides for court approval of com-
promises on behalf of persons under disability in suits or actions to
which they are parties. The 1991 amendment grants the court au-
thority to approve a minor's settlement in trust, with the minor's
guardian or parent serving as trustee.48 An interesting clause reads
that "the court may provide for the termination of such trust at
any time following attainment of majority which the court deems
to be in the best interest of the minor.""9 There should be no prob-
lem with extending such a trust beyond the age of majority for an
incapacitated beneficiary. However, the authority for withholding a
competent trust beneficiary's property after the beneficiary reaches
the age of majority appears dubious and any such attempt would
seem to invite legal challenge.
H. Bona Fide Purchasers of Decedents' Realty
The Code contains several statutes designed to protect bona fide
purchasers of a decedent's realty from claims made under after
discovered wills unless they are probated within one year of the
decedent's death.5 0 A new provision, section 64.1-96.1 of the Code,
protects bona fide purchasers of a decedent's realty from a devisee
or personal representative under a will which is subsequently im-
peached, against claims made by the decedent's heirs, unless the
heirs file a bill in equity for that purpose within one year after
testator's death. The statute provides no remedy for the parallel
case where the impeachment of a will results in the establishment
47. "Reformation" is defined as an "[e]quitable remedy used to reframe written contracts
to reflect accurately real agreement between contracting parties when, either through mu-
tual mistake or unilateral mistake coupled with actual or equitable fraud by other party, the
writing does not embody the contract as actually made." BLACKS LAw DIcTIoNARY 1152 (5th
ed. 1979).
Ironically, the destruction of testator's (settlor's) original purpose that is authorized by
this unfortunate provision is to be accomplished pursuant to a procedure labeled "reforma-
tion," which is the name of a well-recognized common law remedy for accomplishing original
intent.
48. Note that under express language added to § 55-19(C) in 1990, such a trust could not
be a spendthrift trust preventing the minor beneficiary's creditors from having access
thereto. VA. CODE ANN. § 55-19(C) (Cum. Supp. 1990).
49. Id. § 8.01-424(D)(4).
50. Id. § 64.1-95 (Repl. Vol. 1987) (protects purchasers from the heirs); Id. § 64.1-96 (pro-
tecting purchasers from devisees or appropriately empowered personal representatives).
1991]
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of a prior will, instead of intestacy, and the statute's language -
"impeachment. . . which results in intestacy" will apparently ne-
gate any possible intent-oriented construction of the statute to
that end.
I. Estate Mismanagement - Prior Personal Representative
Section 64.1-166 of the Code is amended to repeal the rule of
Coleman v. M'Murdo51 which states that an administrator de bonis
non does not have standing to bring suit against a former personal
representative for mismanagement of estate assets. 52 The language
of the statute that appears to be consistent with Coleman is elimi-
nated and further language is added providing that an administra-
tor de bonis non "shall" be entitled to bring such a suit.
J. Estate Distribution - Show Cause Order
Section 64.1-179 of the Code authorizes the issuance of a "show
cause against distribution" order after six months have passed
from the qualification of the personal representative. The section
had provided that the motion might be made by the personal rep-
resentative, a legatee or a distributee. The 1991 amendment adds
to this group "a successor or substitute personal representative" in
such a way as to indicate that the six-month waiting period will be
computed from the qualification date of the original personal rep-
resentative and not from that of the successor or substitute.5 3
K. Fiduciary Investments - Legal List
Virginia fiduciaries seeking guidance in the fulfillment of their
investment duty may elect to follow the statutory prudent man
rule or the statutory legal list. This latter concept, codified in sec-
tion 26-40 of the Code, identifies specific investments and provides
that they "are and shall be considered lawful investments." In rec-
ognition of the breakup of American Telephone and Telegraph
Company ("A.T.&T.") into the "baby bells," section 26-40(16) of
the Code, a subsection previously occupied only by A.T.&T., is
amended to also include Bell Atlantic, Bell South, Southwestern
51. 26 Va. (5 Rand.) 51 (1827).
52. According to Coleman, only creditors or beneficiaries have the requisite standing to
bring such an action. Id.
53. VA. CODE ANN. § 64.1-179 (Cum. Supp. 1991).
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Bell, Pacific Telesis, Nynex, American Information Technologies,
and U. S. West."
In addition to this amendment to the legal list, the legislature
also passed a resolution requesting the Wills, Trusts and Estates
Section of the Virginia Bar Aesociation and the Virginia Bankers'
Association to "study the status of Virginia's lawful fiduciary in-
vestments, to recommend amendments, deletions and additions to
the list and to make other recommendations as deemed appropri-
ate." This study request was premised upon findings that (i)
there are extremely safe and valuable investments not on the list,
(ii) there are investments presently on the list not as safe or valua-
ble as when placed thereon, (iii) there has been no substantial
modification of the list for many years, and (iv) "the current limits
upon fiduciaries may hamper reasonable investment." 56
L. Commissioners of Accounts - Posting
Section 26-27 of the Code requires commissioners of accounts to
post a list of accounts before them for settlement, along with cer-
tain information regarding these accounts, 7 at the front door of
the relevant courthouse. The 1991 amendment changes the date
for such postings from the first Monday in any month to any day
"during the first week of each month."58
M. Self Dealing - Banks and Trust Companies
Section 6.1-24 of the Code, which governs self-dealing by trust
companies, trust subsidiaries, and banks when serving as a trustee,
has been expanded. It now encompasses self-dealing by these insti-
tutions when serving as a personal representative, applies to trans-
actions with directors thereof, and is declared to be permissible in
limited instances .5 The rule relating to transfers from one estate
to another where both have the same fiduciary, formerly judged by
54. Id. § 26-40.
55. HJR No. 395, 2 1991 Va. Acts 1928.
56. Id.
57. This information must include the names of the fiduciaries, the nature of their ac-
counts, and the name of the persons or entities represented in the accounts.
58. VA. CODE ANN. § 26-27 (Cum. Supp. 1991).
59. The section declares self-dealing transactions to be voidable unless "(i) approved by
an appropriate court, (ii) consented to by all beneficiaries after full and fair disclosure, (iii)
authorized by the instrument creating the fiduciary relationship or (iv) permitted by ruling
of the Commissioner of financial institutions." Id. § 6.1-24.
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satisfying the requirements of section 26-40 (the legal list), will
now be judged by being a permissible fiduciary investment under
any of the provisions found in Title 26 of the Code.60
N. Health Care Decisions - Power of Attorney
Section 37.1-134.4 was added to the Code in 1989 to establish
additional procedures for surrogate treatment decision making on
behalf of adult persons who, due to illness or injury which pre-
cludes communication or impairs judgment, are unable to make in-
formed medical decisions."' The 1991 amendments (i) elevate an
authorized agent under a durable power of attorney from priority
number three under the statute to priority number one,62 and (ii)
eliminate the need for a provider of treatment to make a reasona-
ble inquiry to determine if action authorized by a surrogate would
be protested by the patient.6 "
This section of the Code was also the subject of a 1990 Attorney
General's opinion which concluded that a surrogate decision maker
"is authorized to consent to the withholding or withdrawal of med-
ical treatment, including nutrition and hydration, from an individ-
ual in a persistent vegetative state or irreversible coma, provided
all statutory requirements of § 37.1-134.4 are met." 4
0. Natural Death Act - Persistent Vegetative State - Nutri-
tion and Hydration - Statutory Form
Section 54.1-2982 of the Code, the definitional section of Vir-
ginia's Natural Death Act, is amended to change (A) the definition
of "terminal condition" by (i) replacing "medical certainty" with
"medical probability," (ii) including "persistent vegetative state,"
and (iii) providing a definition for this latter term;65 and (B) the
60. Id.
61. For background and discussion, see Johnson, Wills, Trusts, and Estates: Annual Re-
view of Virginia Law, 23 U. RICH. L. REv. 859, 862-63 (1989).
62. VA. CODE ANN. § 37.1-134.4(B) (Cum. Supp. 1991).
63. Id. at § 37.1-134.4(D).
64. 1990 Op. Va. Att'y Gen. 205 (Sept. 18, 1990).
65. The complete definition now reads:
'Terminal condition' means a condition caused by injury, disease or illness from
which, to a reasonable degree of medical probability, (i) there can be no recovery and
(ii) death is imminent. The term also means a persistent vegetative state, in which a
qualified patient has suffered a loss of consciousness, with no behavioral evidence of
self-awareness or awareness of surroundings in a learned manner, other than reflex
activity of muscles and nerves for low level conditioned response and from which, to a
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definition of "life-prolonging procedure" by adding a sentence
reading "[t]he term includes nutrition and hydration." Section
54.1-2984 of the Code, dealing with the suggested forms6" of writ-
ten declaration, is also amended (i) to eliminate certain language
from both forms,67 and (ii) to provide that "[t]he declarant may
also include a statement directing any specific procedure or treat-
ment to be provided, such as hydration and nutrition."
These amendments were obviously prompted by the increased
public attention to living wills as a result of the United States Su-
preme Court decision in Cruzan v. Director Missouri Department
of Healthe8 and by a related Opinion of the Attorney General of
Virginia.6 9 The net effect of these amendments is to authorize the
withholding or withdrawal of artificially supplied nutrition and hy-
dration for persons in a persistent vegetative state, or an irreversi-
ble coma,7 0 unless the patient has made an affirmation to the con-
trary. These amendments specifically apply to previously existing
declarations. 1
reasonable degree of medical probability, there can be no recovery.
VA. CODE ANN. § 54.1-2982 (Cum. Supp. 1991).
66. Id. § 54.1-2984 (Repl. Vol. 1991) provides a form for a person to make a decision, and
another form for a person to appoint an agent to make a decision on the person's behalf.
67. The second paragraph of both the declaration and the agency form had provided in
part as follows: "If at any time I should have a terminal condition [and my attending physi-
cian has determined that there can be no recovery from such condition, my death is immi-
nent,] ... ." In the 1991 version, the italicized language in brackets has been eliminated.
68. 110 S. Ct. 2841 (1990).
69. The Attorney General opined that a declaration under Virginia's Natural Death Act
would not authorize the withdrawal of artificially supplied nutrition and hydration from a
person in a persistent vegetative state or an irreversible coma unless the patient "has been
certified in writing by his or her physician to be in a terminal condition." As terminal condi-
tion was defined at that time to require that the patient's death be "imminent," this re-
quirement practically eliminated the possibility of any action in the case of a patient in a
persistent vegetative state or irreversible coma. 1990 Op. Va. Att'y Gen. at 208.
70. The term "irreversible coma" is not included within the language of the statutory
definition of "terminal condition" found in § 54.1-2982 of the Code, and this term does not
have a precise meaning in the medical-legal community. See VA. CoDE ANN. § 54.1-2982
(Repl. Vol. 1991). However, as this term may be most frequently used by the consumer and
professional alike to mean a permanent loss of all consciousness, it would appear to be in-
cluded within the statutory definition of "persistent vegetative state." This definition is
found in supra note 65. The term "irreversible coma" would also seem to encompass the
patient's condition in Hazelton v. Powhatan Nursing Home, Inc., 6 Va. Cir. 414 (County of
Fairfax Cir. Ct. 1986).
71. "The provisions of this act shall apply to any declaration executed pursuant to § 54.1-
2983 without regard to the date on which it was executed." Act of Mar. 25, 1991, ch. 583, 1
1991 Va. Acts 1043, 1044, cl. 2.
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III. 1990-91 JUDICIAL DECISIONS
A. Inter Vivos Gifts - Delivery
In Young v. Young, 2 a father directed his sister, who held the
bulk of his stock in his corporation in a trust for him, to transfer
some of his stock to his daughters on six occasions over a five year
period. Although new stock certificates were issued in the daugh-
ters' names on each occasion, and the corporate stock transfer
ledger reflected their ownership, the daughters were only aware of
the first transfer and this stock was the only stock actually deliv-
ered to them. On the other five occasions, without the daughters'
knowledge or consent, the father signed the daughters' names in
the stock transfer ledger, followed by the notation "[father] Atty.,"
to evidence their receipt.73
Although the corporate records and the certificates in the daugh-
ters' names are prima facie evidence of their ownership, the court
determined that this evidence "'possesses no such magic or sacred-
ness as to prevent an inquiry into the facts.' "74 Delivery and ac-
ceptance are common law requirements for an inter vivos gift.
These requirements are not eliminated by the statutes relating to
security transfers;7 5 indeed these statutes further condition an ef-
fective transfer of securities upon the transferee (or the trans-
feree's designee) acquiring possession thereof. The court held that
"[b]ecause the disputed securities were never delivered to the
daughters nor to anyone designated by the daughters to receive
them, no inter vivos gift was ever made.""0
B. Causa Mortis Gift - Delivery
Fourteen years before his death, the donor in Brown v. Metz77
delivered a key to his safe deposit box to a donee. The donee testi-
fied7" that, shortly prior to the donor's death, the donor told him
72. 240 Va. 57, 393 S.E.2d 398 (1990).
73. Id. at 60, 393 S.E.2d at 399.
74. Id. at 62, 393 S.E.2d at 400 (quoting Swan v. Swan's Ex'r, 136 Va. 496, 519, 117 S.E.
858, 865 (1923)).
75. The court's decision also dealt with the effectiveness of the alleged gift from the
standpoint of the requirements for the transfer of securities under the Virginia Uniform
Commercial Code, VA. CODE ANN. § 8.1-201(32) (Cum. Supp. 1991); Id. §§ 8.8-102, -309, -313
(Added Vol. 1965).
76. 240 Va. at 64, 393 S.E.2d at 401 (1990) (emphasis in original).
77. 240 Va. 127, 393 S.E.2d 402 (1990).
78. It was contended that the donee's testimony was insufficient to sustain the alleged gift
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to "'empty the contents of the box and give to [Brown] what has
her name on it, and the rest was to be for my use and my family
use.' "I9 The donee further testified that on the day following his
removal of the box's contents he informed the donor of this fact
and the donor replied "'Good.' o
The court rejected the. contention that, to make a valid delivery
under these circumstances, the donee had to actually place the
gifted property in the donor's hands in order that donor might
then make a manual delivery thereof to the donee. "[W]e have not
retreated to such a formalistic approach and refuse to do so here.
Delivery occurred when the donee, at the donor's instruction, re-
moved the bonds from the donor's custody and exercised dominion
and control over them."81
C. Inter Vivos Gifts - Questions of Fact
In Stone v. Alley, 2 the trial court's grant of summary judgment
for plaintiff was held to be erroneous because of three material
questions of fact in dispute. These questions were (i) the existence
of donative intent, (ii) whether Paine Webber Company was a "fi-
nancial institution" within the meaning of that term in section 6.1-
125.3(A) of the Code, and (iii) whether Paine Webber securities
held as joint tenants with the right of survivorship are an "ac-
count" within the meaning of that term in section 6.1-125.3(A) of
the Code. 3
D. Holographic Will - Disinterested Witnesses
Bowers v. Huddleston8 4 arose out of an attempt to probate a ho-
lographic will which, among other matters, required the testimony
of two disinterested witnesses that the putative will was wholly in
without corroboration under the deadman's statute (VA. CODE ANN. § 8.01-397). The court
concluded that this rule was not applicable because the donee's testimony was given when
he was called as an adverse witness and was not inherently improbable or contradicted. 240
Va. at 131-32, 393 S.E.2d at 404 (citing Balderson v. Robertson, 203 Va. 484, 488, 125 S.E.2d
180, 184 (1962).
79. Id. at 129, 393 S.E.2d at 403.
80. Id.
81. Id. at 131-32, 393 S.E.2d at 404.
82. 240 Va. 162, 392 S.E.2d 486 (1990).
83. Id. at 163, 392 S.E.2d at 486.
84. 241 Va. 83, 399 S.E.2d 811 (1991).
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the testator's handwriting.8 5 One of the persons who testified
clearly qualified as a disinterested witness. The court held that in
regard to the other person, "[tihe specific question is whether an
expert's testimony, comparing the will with exemplars of the testa-
tor's handwriting, is sufficient without proof, by a disinterested
witness, that the exemplars were themselves in the testator's hand-
writing. The chancellor held such testimony insufficient, and we
agree."' 6
E. Will Construction - Life Tenant's Income Right
The primary issue in Sturgis v. Stinson87 was the life tenant's
rights to income when an asset with a fair market value of
$1,500,000.00, comprising 75% of trust corpus, yielded a net in-
come of only $1,265.99. In a five to two decision, the court noted
that "[w]e have not previously addressed the duty of a fiduciary
regarding the level of productivity of trust assets in circumstances
where there are successive beneficiaries and no explicit instruction
by the testator concerning that duty."88 To help decide this issue,
the court adopted' several general principles set out in the Re-
statement of Trusts.90 The majority concluded that these princi-
ples "define a trustee's obligations under the 'prudent man rule'91
regarding productivity of trust assets,"9' 2 and remanded the case to
the trial court for further proceedings consistent therewith. On a
secondary issue, the majority further concluded that the principles
relating to delayed income93 "are also applicable here"9 4 and
85. VA. CODE ANN. § 64.1-49 (Repl. Vol. 1987).
86. Bowers, 241 Va. at 84, 399 S.E.2d at 812.
87. 241 Va. 531, 404 S.E.2d 56 (1991).
88. Id. at 538, 404 S.E.2d at 60.
89. Id. at 538, 404 S.E.2d at 60.
90. The first principle provides as follows: "The trustee is under a duty to the beneficiary
to use reasonable care and skill to make the trust property productive." RESTATEMENT (SEc-
OND) OF TRusTs § 181 (1959). The second principle provides as follows:
Unless it is otherwise provided by the terms of the trust, if property held in trust to
pay the income to a beneficiary for a designated period and thereafter to pay the
principal to another beneficiary produces no income or an income substantially less
that the current rate of return on trust investments, and is likely to continue unpro-
ductive or under-productive, the trustee is under a duty to the beneficiary entitled to
the income to sell such property within a reasonable time.
RESTATEMENT (SECOND) TRUSTS § 240 (1959).
91. For the prudent man rule see VA. CODE ANN. § 26-45.1 (Repl. Vol. 1985).
92. 241 Va. at 538, 404 S.E.2d at 60.
93. The principles of delayed income referred to by the court, found in Virginia's Uniform
Principle and Income Act were (i) the provision entitling the income beneficiary to share in
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should also be considered on remand.
F. Separation Agreement - Impact on Will Provisions
In Blunt v. Lentz,9 5 a wife neglected to revoke her will in favor
of her husband following their separation. Upon the wife's death
the children claimed that the husband had waived his right to take
under the wife's will in their separation agreement, and thus the
children were her successors in interest. Although the separation
agreement contained general language whereby the husband and
wife released each other from all claims and demands arising from
their relationship as husband and wife, "[n]othing in the agree-
ment affects the husband's capacity to inherit as a beneficiary of
the wife's will." 98 Accordingly, the trial court decision in favor of
the children was reversed.
G. Legitimacy - Artificial Insemination
Prior to the 1978 revision of children's inheritance rights,97 the
intestate succession provisions of the Code contained three sec-
tions dealing with the legitimation of children. As a part of the
1978 revision, former section 64.1-6 of the Code (dealing with legit-
imation by marriage and recognition) and former section 64.1-7 of
the Code (dealing with legitimation of issue born of illegal, void or
dissolved marriages) were somewhat rewritten, combined into a
new section, and relocated to the domestic relations title of the
Code. 8 However, left untouched in the 1978 revision was section
delayed income during the period of delay, from § 55-263(1), (ii) the definition of delayed
income, from § 55-263(2), and (iii) the calculation of the period of delay, from § 55-263(3).
Id. at 539, 404 S.E.2d at 60-61 (citing VA. CODE ANN. §§ 55-253 to -268. (Repl. Vol. 1986)).
94. Id. at 539, 404 S.E.2d at 61.
95. 241 Va. 547, 404 S.E.2d 62 (1991).
96. Id. at 551, 404 S.E.2d at 64-65. The court goes on to note that it has repeatedly
stated:
It is the function of the court to construe the contract made by the parties, not to
make a contract for them. The question for the court is what did the parties agree to
as evidenced by their contract. The guiding light in the construction of a contract is
the intention of the parties as expressed by them in the words they have used, and
courts are bound to say that the parties intended what the written instrument
plainly declares.
Id. at 552, 404 S.E.2d at 65 (quoting Great Falls Hardware v. South Lakes Village Center,
238 Va. 123, 125-26, 880 S.E.2d 642, 643-44 (1989)) (emphasis in original).
97. For background and discussion, see Johnson, supra note 3.
98. This was accomplished as a part of 1978 General Assembly action. The new combined
section, provides as follows:
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64.1-7.1 of the Code, which provided as follows:
Any child born to a married woman, which was conceived by means
of artificial insemination performed by a licensed physician at the
request of and with the consent in writing of such woman and her
husband shall be presumed, for all purposes the legitimate natural
child of such woman and such husband the same as a natural child
not conceived by means of artificial insemination."
This statute was poorly misconstrued in Welborn v. Common-
wealth,10 0 where the court stated "[t]he sole issue is whether a man
by proceeding in accordance with Code § 63.1-221 may adopt a
child born to his wife by artificial insemination with a third party
donor's sperm."' 0 ' First, the court twice referred to section 64.1-7.1
as relating only to inheritance matters, 0 2 notwithstanding its his-
torical context, and its express language of "for all purposes." Sec-
ondly, the court stated twice that section 64.1-7.1 of the Code
"merely establishes a presumption,"' 03 that "a presumption may
be rebutted when facts to the contrary are established,"'' 4 and that
"our statutes105 on the subject of artificial insemination are not so
ambiguous that we could construe them as providing protections
[against any claims by the sperm donor]. ' '"06
Some response needs to be made to these latter statements. Re-
course to Black's Law Dictionary indicates that the word "pre-
If a person, having had a child, shall afterwards intermarry with the mother or
father, such child if recognized by both of them, as their own child, jointly or sepa-
rately, before or after marriage, shall be deemed legitimate.
The issue of marriages prohibited by law, deemed null or void or dissolved by a
court shall nevertheless be legitimate.
VA. CODE ANN. § 20-31.1 (Repl. Vol. 1990).
99. VA. CODE ANN. § 64.1-7.1 (Repl. Vol. 1987) (amended 1991)(emphasis added).
100. 10 Va. App. 631, 394 S.E.2d 732 (1990).
101. Id. at 632, 394 S.E.2d at 733.
102. Id. at 632, 394 S.E.2d at 733-34.
103. Id. at 633-34, 394 S.E.2d at 733.
104. Id. at 634, 394 S.E.2d at 733.
105. The other statute before the court provided in part as follows: "A child born of a
married woman, who conceived the child by means of artificial insemination with consent of
her husband, shall be deemed legitimate and the birth certificate of such child shall contain
full information concerning the mother's husband as the father of the child." Id. at 633, 394
S.E.2d at 733 (quoting VA. CODE ANN. § 32.1-257(D) (Repl. Vol. 1985) (emphasis added).
This section was amended by the 1991 session. For a discussion of the amendments, see
Shepherd, Legal Issues Involving Children: Annual Survey of Virginia Law, 25 U. RICH. L.
REv. 773 (1991).
106. Welborn, 10 Va. App. at 635, 394 S.E.2d at 734.
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sumption" has a number of possible meanings and thus, standing
alone, is inherently ambiguous. One possible meaning is
"nonrebuttable;" a fair synonym for "deemed." As the language
corresponding to the "shall -be presumed" of section 64.1-7.1 of the
Code is "shall be deemed" in pari materia section 32.1-257(D), 10 7
this gives particularly strong support for the ambiguous word "pre-
sumption" in section 64.1-7.1 to be resolved as "nonrebuttable" or
"deemed." Moreover, the assertion that the legislature intended a
rebuttable presumption defies all logic because in many, if not a
majority, of the cases it is a given that the sperm is not that of the
mother's husband. 108 Surely it could not have been the intention of
this section to create a rebuttable presumption that the mother's
husband is the father in cases where it is an admitted fact that he
cannot be. Finally, from a policy standpoint, a "non-rebuttable"
construction would extend protection to numerous families who, in
the light of a "rebuttable" construction, may be compelled to sub-
mit to the inconvenience and expense of adoption proceedings in
order to guarantee their status.
Fortunately, the 1991 session of the legislature has amended sec-
tion 64.1-7.1 to eliminate the negative impact of this case not only
for the future but, by providing that this amendment is "declara-
tory of existing law," for the past as well. 10 9
IV. CONCLUSION
The 1991 session saw the introduction of several actions affect-
ing the area of wills, trusts, and estates law. An effort to repeal the
augmented estate section of the Code failed. Many other efforts, as
revealed in this article, succeeded.
107. This statute deals with the issuance of birth certificates in cases where children are
conceived by artificial insemination. See the emphasized words in this statute, partially
quoted in supra note 105.
108. In some cases it is his sperm and other cases it is a combination of his and a donor's
sperm.
109. VA. CODE ANN. § 64.7-7.1 (Repl. Vol. 1991).
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